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56 
The International Human Rights  
Movement Today 
BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL* 
 
I begin by asking: is there such a thing as an International Human 
Rights Movement?  I would like to raise that as an issue that we need 
to address, whether there is one movement or multiple movements 
within the human rights tradition, and whether there are in fact 
movements that might be part of the human rights tradition but 
nevertheless do not use or rely on the discourse of international 
human rights.  In other words, diversity and contradiction within the 
Human Rights Movement is a theme that I think we need to focus on 
and problematize.  And we should also start by recognizing that 
‗international human rights‘ is a language, a language of both power 
and resistance.  It is a language of hegemony and counter-hegemony, 
and we need to recognize the multiple uses to which it is put and the 
fact that it is a terrain of contestation, as I have argued before, for 
multiple deployments of both power and resistance.1   
I also think we need to start by problematizing the ‗origins‘ of the 
International Human Rights Movement.  To say that we should talk 
about international human rights ―sixty years on‖ is to tie us to a 
particular era with a beginning from the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and to a privileged type of expertise, especially law, 
 
* Associate Professor of Law and Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and 
Director, Program on Human Rights and Justice, Center for International Studies, Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology. 
1. BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003) [hereinafter RAJAGOPAL, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW]; Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Counter-hegemonic International 
Law: Rethinking Human Rights and Development as a Third World Strategy, 27 THIRD 
WORLD Q. 767 (2006) [hereinafter Rajagopal, Counter-hegemonic International Law]. 
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as the mechanism through which this particular language expresses 
itself.  Some of the biggest issues in today‘s Human Rights 
Movement in fact raise questions both about the political conse-
quences of rights, as well as the nature of the type of expertise that is 
deployed in realizing human rights claims.2  So I want to make three 
points briefly, and then leave the reader with three questions, which I 
think are very important for both scholars and practitioners of human 
rights today.  
The three points that I want to make are as follows.  First, I want to 
talk about what I shall call the ―birth defect‖ of the International 
Human Rights Movement, as well as the nature of the relationship 
between what I will call ‗counter-narratives‘ of human rights and the 
official narratives of human rights.  By birth defect, I mean both the 
well-noted challenge to the official beginnings of the international 
human rights regime in terms of its representativity,3 and its being 
able to speak on behalf of all.  Various scholars and writers have 
examined this at length,4 so I will not belabor the point but will 
simply note the absence of particular cultures and communities and 
viewpoints in the making of international human rights.  We need to 
recognize and be honest about such absences.  The birth defect of 
international human rights was never fully cured in a sense, partly 
because of the way in which it responded, in my view, to the most 
dominant political question of the second half of the 20
th
 century, 
which was not the Cold War, but colonialism.5  Colonialism was the 
larger story in which the Cold War was, of course, one of the plots.  
But colonialism was left in place by human rights, ostensibly the 
leading moral discourse of the day.6  The structures of colonialism, as 
well as the structures of the economic order that colonialism 
supported, were left in place, and international human rights did not 
rise up to be the language through which such structures were going 
 
2. See generally Martti Koskenniemi, The Effect of Rights on Political Culture, in THE 
EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 99 (Philip Alston, Mara Bustelo & James Heenan eds., 1999); 
David Kennedy, The Politics of the Invisible College: International Governance and the 
Politics of Expertise, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 463 (2001). 
3. See, e.g., Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT‘L L. 589 
(1996). 
4. See, e.g., COSTAS DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2000); UPENDRA BAXI, THE 
FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002). 
5. RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW, supra note 1; see also ANTONY 
ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
6. See generally RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW, supra note 1. 
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to be challenged.   
But I also think that we need to recognize the nature of the 
counter-narratives of human rights that arose and pushed back the 
official version‘s blind-spots and biases.  These counter-narratives of 
human rights, as I have argued, should not be seen simply in terms of 
a traditional analytical lens of state politics, but instead, through the 
theory and practice of social movements.7  Looked at this way, the 
origins of international human rights could be extended back further 
into the struggles of labor in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, the 
human rights rebellions of women and slaves, and a range of anti-
colonial movements.8  The point is simply that you could seek any 
number of beginnings of human rights, and those beginnings are, of 
course, not part of the official history of ‗international human rights.‘  
They are certainly not part of law schools‘ curricula when they teach 
international human rights law.  It is by now well recognized by 
mostly everyone except the narrowest legal experts that the politics of 
human rights was and is in many ways generated by a range of social 
movements or ordinary people, not only by states and elites.  Of 
course states played a role in the formal creation of texts, but I think 
it is a mistake to focus our attention only on states.  These 
movements were both local and global at the same time, such as the 
African-American movement,9 and not simply global alone.  And 
they were not particularly law-centric or law focused in any easy or 
particular way.10  Recognizing this raises the question in very sig-
nificant ways of what role law plays in the International Human 
Rights Movement.  This is a question that many of us are grappling 
with at this stage,11 as well as with the consequences of what has been 
termed ‗over-legalizing‘ human rights,12 a topic to which I will come.   
 
7. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law and the Development Encounter: Violence 
and Resistance at the Margins, 93 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 16 (1999); RAJAGOPAL, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW, supra note 1. 
8. See MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO 
THE GLOBALIZATION ERA (2004). 
9. See CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN 
AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944–1955 (2003). 
10. See e.g., SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANS-
LATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2006). 
11. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’ Kosovo, and the 
Turn to Ethics in International Law, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159 (2002); Rajagopal, Counter-
hegemonic International Law, supra note 1. 
12. Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory 
and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. 
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At this stage, it is striking that many of us are rejecting some of the 
easy consensus positions of the past, which are that international 
human rights has a monopoly on truth, justice, or resistance, or the 
idea that international human rights is a kind of totalizing language of 
emancipation.  Instead, I want to recognize that languages of eman-
cipation are multiple, and have a contradictory and sometimes uneasy 
relationship with what we call ―international human rights.‖  And 
further, the successes and failures of what today we call international 
human rights are directly the consequence of both its birth defects as 
well as the influence of the counter-narratives on the official human 
rights discourse, and the way in which the official human rights 
discourse has interacted with or ‗received‘ these counter-narratives.  
That relationship is a problematic one, and we need to try to 
understand the ways in which it is problematic.   
The second point I want to make is about the role of Third World 
states in international human rights.  I think that we can all agree that 
international human rights has been, by and large, about Third World 
states.  And I think that it is fair to say that international human rights 
is what it is because of Third World states.  I say this in two senses, 
both a negative sense as well as a positive sense.  The negative sense 
is in terms of what Makau Mutua has referred to as a metaphor of 
human rights, of ―savages, victims and saviors.‖13  The savages being, 
of course, the Third World dictators, the victims being the poor Third 
World people, as well as anyone not like us, and, of course, the 
saviors being those of us, the heroes in the West, who work to rescue 
them.  The moral and political implications of this notion need to be 
talked about.   
The second—positive—way in which international human rights 
has been influenced by Third World states is less recognized, that is, 
in terms of the way in which many of the most significant advances 
in human rights that we take for granted these days arose from the 
issues that were put on the global agenda by Third World states.  
Particularly, I am thinking of the politics of the U.N. at the Com-
mission on Human Rights in the 1960s and '70s.  It was the Third 
World states that put the biggest human rights issues on the agenda, 
including that of colonialism, racial discrimination and apartheid, and 
 
L. REV. 1832 (2002). 
13. Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 
HARV. INT‘L L.J. 201 (2001). 
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later economic, social, and cultural rights.  In other words, the issues 
that actually matter for the bulk of the world‘s population were put on 
the human rights agenda by Third World States.14  India‘s role, to 
offer an example, in putting racial discrimination against its own 
nationals in apartheid South Africa on the U.N. Agenda in 1946 was 
a kind of door-opening moment in the international human rights 
field.  There is also, of course, the historical irony that now India is 
often on the opposite side of the fence on human rights at the U.N. on 
a number of issues.  But to recognize these contradictory positions is 
to recognize that today international human rights needs to be 
understood through the political economy of state formation in the 
Third World.  Why is it that these changes have taken place, and how 
do these changes relate to internal changes within nation-states?  On 
this matter, the point I want to leave you with is simply that contrary 
to how we imagine the official history of international human rights, 
Third World states have played a major role in its making and they 
also constitute a principle domain of its deployment.  I do not think 
this is a sense that is actually taught or problematized in much of 
human rights teaching, particularly in law schools. 
The third point that I want to make has to do with the fact that 
international human rights today is not just a language of resistance, 
but it is also a language of power.  It is a language of management in 
conflict and peace studies, for example.  It is even a language of 
profit that companies deploy to give themselves brand names.  I think 
that there are several dangers associated with this repositioning of 
human rights.  I want to call this the danger of Constitutionalizing 
international human rights, with a capital ―C.‖  
There are three senses in which I think that international human 
rights is getting Constitutionalized.15  One is a kind of global 
constitutionalism, in which there is a convergence, both in the 
popular-culture sense, as well as in the institutional sense of, for 
example, revisions of legal texts and constitutions, and the practice of 
constitutional courts converging on what you could call a similar 
reading of a dominant script called international human rights.  I do 
not think that there is something bad in convergence per se, because I 
 
14. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Lipstick on a Caterpillar?  Assessing the New U.N. 
Human Rights Council Through Historical Reflection, 13 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 7 (2007). 
15. See generally Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 
771 (1997). 
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do not have any evidence to show that convergence would be in fact 
a bad idea on empirics alone, nor do I have evidence that textual 
convergence actually produces convergence in practice.  What I am 
also worried about is the nature of the backlash that such a conver-
gence would produce, and is producing in a number of areas, which I 
think international human rights advocates do not appreciate much.  
For example, in U.S. domestic law, you can think about Roe v. 
Wade16 as a success or you could think about it as success at a given 
moment that produced a backlash in the next two decades, which 
ended up in fact problematizing not just the politics of the body or 
sexual relations, or the question of women‘s rights, but the whole 
structure of women‘s rights in many different ways.17   
The second way in which international human rights is getting 
Constitutionalized is the way in which it is increasingly being used as 
a kind of Archimedean point to judge the effectiveness or the 
legitimacy of policies in a range of fields, such as development, 
security, humanitarianism, and social policy.18  I think that there are 
many problems with this, including the possibility that it could end 
up importing the biases of international human rights into many of 
those other policy areas. 
The third sense in which there is a problem with Constitution-
alizing international human rights has to do with the over-legalizing 
of human rights, which I think is a danger, while ignoring its moral 
and political dimensions.  Given the great proliferation of global 
norms and courts, there was for many years a systematic sidelining of 
local democratic experiments as laboratories of rights.  There is now 
an urgent need to talk about how to increase the politics of the local 
in international human rights, and to figure out how to write this 
resistance of the local into international human rights.  In my own 
work, I have argued that one way in which this could be done is by 
engaging the counter-narratives of social movements and their 
alternative readings of human rights.19 
I want to conclude by saying that in many ways international 
 
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
17. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Back-
lash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373 (2007). 
18. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Invoking the Rule of Law in Post-conflict Rebuilding: A 
Critical Examination, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1347 (2008). 
19. RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW, supra note 1. 
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human rights today at sixty is like many people who are sixty years 
old.  It is recognizing many of its problems: it is a little bit 
overweight, and it has ballooned in size, but the very expansion in 
size brings about problems.  It is time for us to go for a visit to the 
doctor.  I think there are many issues that arise from the troubled 
relationship between international human rights, with its privileged 
language of law, and the counter-narratives of social movements and 
other actors.  I would frame them in the form of three questions and 
leave them for exploration and discussion.  First, can we 
vernacularize human rights without excessive legalism, particularly 
in understandings of resistance?  Second, can we legalize without 
constitutionalizing human rights, with a capital ―C‖?  Particularly, 
can we escape past institutional forms that would reproduce past 
patterns of power and domination?  And third, can we critique 
legalism itself without surrendering to symbolism in some ways, for 
example, of soft-law standards in corporate codes?  In other words, is 
there perhaps a downside to giving up on the law too much?  These 
are questions with which many of us grapple, both in terms of our 
activist orientations, as well as in scholarly engagement. 
